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Abstract 
Differential labour market returns to male and female education are one potential 
explanation for large gender gaps in education in Pakistan. We empirically test this 
explanation by estimating private returns to education separately for male and female wage 
earners. This paper contributes to the literature by using a variety of methodologies (Ordinary 
Least Squares, Heckman correction, 2SLS and household fixed effects) in order to 
consistently estimate economic returns to education.  Earnings function estimates reveal a 
sizeable gender asymmetry in economic returns to education, with returns to women’s 
education being substantially and statistically significantly higher than men’s. However, a 
decomposition of the gender wage gap suggests that there is highly differentiated treatment by 
employers. We conclude that the total labour market returns are much higher for men, despite 
returns to education being higher for women. This suggests that parents may have an 
investment motive in allocating more resources to boys than to girls within households.  
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1. Introduction 
While Pakistan’s large and persistent gender gaps in education are well-documented, 
explaining their existence and obstinacy has proven more difficult. This paper tests one - the 
labour market - explanation for gender gaps in education in Pakistan2. Based on the 
investment motive, it contends that if the labour market rewards men’s schooling more than 
women’s or if it more generally discriminates among the two genders, parents may have an 
incentive to invest more in boys’ education. In this study, we test whether the rewards to 
females are less than to males in Pakistan’s labour market, i.e. whether the return to educating 
females is lower than that for men. We also ask more generally whether there is wider gender 
differentiated treatment in the labour market, i.e. whether much or all of the gender gap in 
earnings is explained by differences in male and female characteristics.  
Private economic returns to education are estimated using Mincer’s semi-logarithmic 
approach in a regression linking individual earnings with additional years (or levels) of 
schooling completed (Mincer, 1974). As is well known, establishing a causal relationship 
between education and earnings is problematic. Among the issues to contend with are biases 
due to omitted variables, measurement error in reported schooling, distinguishing between 
homogenous and heterogeneous returns to education, and selection into wage employment. 
Moreover, while human capital theory hypothesises a concave education-earnings profile and 
diminishing returns to human capital production, empirical evidence from various countries 
has challenged the prevailing view (see Behrman and Wolfe, 1984 and Alderman and Sahn, 
1988; and more recently Kingdon, 1998; Kingdon and Unni, 2001; Duraisamy (2002); Belzil 
and Hansen, 2002; Söderbom, Teal, Wambugu and Kahyarara, 2005; Ashraf and Ashraf, 
1993a, 1993b; and Nasir, 2002). This finding raises serious policy concerns and warrants 
further investigation.  
Despite these concerns, Mincerian returns remain popular and have been widely 
estimated (see Psacharopoulos, 1994, and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). Estimates of 
private returns to education, though available for Pakistan are mostly dated and often 
constrained by data (Hamdani, 1977; Haque, 1977; Guisinger, Henderson and Scully, 1984; 
                                                 
2 Alternative explanations of gender differentiated parental treatment are: a) pure son preference and b) 
that the returns accruing to parents from a daughters’ education are lower than those accruing from 
sons’ education (maybe because daughters’ in-laws reap the benefits of her education upon marriage) 
and economic necessity (or parental selfishness) potentially increases the likelihood that boys are sent 
to school compared to girls. However, Alderman and King (1998) note that it is difficult to distinguish 
empirically between these various explanations.   
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Khan and Irfan, 1985; Shabbir, 1991; Shabbir and Khan, 1991; Ashraf and Ashraf, 1993a, 
1993b; Shabbir, 1994;  Nasir, 1998; Siddiqui and Siddiqui, 1998; Nasir, 1999; Nasir, 2002; 
Asadullah, 2005, and Riboud, Savchenko and Tan, 2006). There are two consistent findings 
from past studies in Pakistan: (i) returns to education are low as compared to other developing 
countries and (ii) returns increase with the level of education. The latter finding challenges the 
dominant view that the earnings function is concave. 
The estimation of returns to education by gender has received less attention in the 
literature partly because in many countries gender differences are not so large. When 
estimates are available, the evidence from developing countries is mixed. While some studies 
find returns to schooling to not differ significantly by gender (Behrman and Wolfe, 1984 and 
Schultz, 1993), others discover lower returns to women’s schooling (Kingdon, 1998) or 
higher returns (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1995 and Asadullah, 2006). Previous studies in 
Pakistan mostly compute returns to education for males only and hence, are not able to 
answer the central question addressed in this study: does the labour market explain lower 
female schooling in Pakistan?  Two recent exceptions are Nasir (2002) and Riboud et al. 
(2006). While the former (Nasir, 2002) implies that the answer to this question is a ‘yes’, the 
latter (Riboud et al. 2006) finds higher returns to women’s education, suggesting otherwise. 
These contradictory findings generate a puzzle in the literature. However, as neither of these 
studies addresses various methodological problems, their estimates could be biased, raising 
some uncertainty about their findings.    
The objective of this paper is to estimate returns to education by gender in a 
consistent manner to determine whether childhood and adolescent education investments are 
affected by how the labour market rewards adult education. Both ‘One Factor’ and ‘Multiple 
Factor’ models are used. In the former, education is defined as a continuous variable (years of 
education completed). This is a restrictive specification as it assumes that the return to 
education is the same for different education levels. The alternative model (‘Multiple Factor’) 
specifies education in level form – each level is allowed to have a different effect on earnings. 
This is clearly more flexible than a quadratic specification that includes education in years 
and its square (Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi, 2005). Briefly, four main methods of 
estimation are utilised: (i) Standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS); (ii) the Heckman two-step 
procedure which deals with the sample selectivity issues which arise because earnings are 
only observed for individuals who participate in the waged-labour force and who may 
therefore form a non-random sub-sample of the population; (iii) 2SLS estimates using family 
background measures (parental education and spouse’s education) as instrumental variables 
for schooling, to deal with endogeneity and measurement error in schooling; (iv) household 
fixed effects estimation to control for unobserved family-specific heterogeneity. For this, 
estimates are based on spouse pairs, sibling pairs and parent-child pairs. In all four methods 
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we allow for the possibility that parameters differ between the two genders, by estimating 
separate earnings functions by gender3. Latest, nationally representative data from the 
Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS, 2002) are used for the analysis.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical strategy while 
Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 analyses the empirical findings and Section 5 
concludes.  
2. Empirical Strategy 
This study adopts the standard Mincerian approach of estimating earnings functions to 
compute rates of returns to education by gender. The earnings-schooling relationship can be 
stated in the form of a semi-logarithmic relationship as follows: 
  
LnYi = β0 + β1Si + β2X1i + β3X2 + εi     (1a) 
      Si = γ0 + γ1X3i + γ2X4 + μi      (1b) 
 
In (1a), LnYi is the log of earnings4 of individual i, Si measures years of completed 
schooling in a ‘One Factor’ model (or levels of schooling with dummy variables representing 
various levels of completed schooling in ‘Multiple Factor’ models), X1i is a vector of 
observed characteristics of individual i, X2 is a vector of observed characteristics of the family 
and εi is the individual-specific error. Equation (1b) models determinants of schooling where 
X3i is a vector of observed characteristics of individual i, X4 is a vector of household-level 
covariates and μi is a residual term. The coefficient on schooling, β1, measures the rate of 
return to each additional year of schooling (or to a particular level of schooling). This 
formulation assumes that the rate of return estimate is ‘homogenous’ i.e. identical across all 
individuals, i.  
We start by estimating Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models of earnings functions 
on male and female wage earners to provide some baseline results. However, OLS estimates 
of earnings functions potentially suffer from sample selectivity, omitted variables and 
measurement error biases. On the first, earnings are observed only for individuals 
participating in the paid labour force. Moreover, most studies focus on waged-workers while 
many individuals in developing countries, especially men, are self employed rather than in 
waged work. Consequently, estimates of returns to education of wage-workers are on a 
potentially non-random draw from the population, resulting in sample selection. In most 
applied work, Heckman’s correction for sample selectivity is used. This entails estimating a 
                                                 
3 In this study we are unable to deal with measurement error (except when using the IV method) and 
although we are able to sign the bias (downward), its magnitude remains unquantified.  
4 Wages are a better measure of labour productivity as earnings incorporate labour supply decisions and 
a return to capital. Lack of data on wages often prompts use of earnings. 
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waged-work participation equation and the predicted probabilities of waged work from this 
equation  are used to derive the selectivity term, lambda (λ), which is then included in the 
main earnings function, such as (1a). To identify lambda the participation equation must 
include exclusion restrictions which are not part of the vector X in (1a). 
The second problem has to do with omitted variable bias. The coefficient on 
schooling in the earnings function can only be interpreted as the causal effect of education on 
earnings if earnings differentials between individuals with varying years of schooling do not 
reflect differences in unobserved ability that happens to be correlated with education. 
Unobserved inherent ability is clearly a determinant of schooling attainment as well as of 
earnings, and generates endogeneity of schooling in the earnings function yielding 
inconsistent estimates of returns to schooling.   
  Finally, measurement error (ME) in the schooling variable Si generates a correlation 
between the error terms in the earnings and schooling functions inducing attenuation bias in 
the regression coefficient β1. This problem is compounded in sibling-studies as differencing 
within families reduces the true signal-to-noise ratio in schooling.   
Various methods have been used in extant literature to address school endogeneity in 
an earnings function framework. The Instrumental Variables (IV) methodology identifies 
variables (instruments) that are correlated with schooling and uncorrelated with unobserved 
ability and measurement errors. This method provides a solution to endogeneity with the 
advantage that it simultaneously addresses ME issues. The key challenge is finding suitable 
instruments. Social and natural experiments are useful and many studies using ‘institutional 
variations’ in schooling due to such factors as proximity to schools, minimum school-leaving 
age etc. have been used to instrument for schooling. Card (1995b, 1999 and 2001) provides a 
summary of some of the recent studies that use this approach and include Angrist and 
Kreuger, 1991, Butcher and Case, 1994, Card, 1995a, and Harmon and Walker, 1995, among 
others. The consensus from contemporary research on developed countries is that IV 
estimates based on natural experiments are as high as and sometimes almost 20 percent higher 
than corresponding OLS estimates (Card, 2001). The evidence from developing countries is 
mixed and inconclusive (see Strauss and Thomas, 1995, for a review and Maluccio, 1998 and 
Duflo, 2001 for returns to education estimates using ‘institutional variation’ for Philippines 
and Indonesia).  
However, experiment-based IV approaches have exacting data demands and an 
alternative is to use non-experimental IVs for endogenous schooling. As children’s schooling 
outcomes are to a large extent driven by family background (FB), variables such as father’s 
education and mother’s education are sometimes used (Söderbom et al., 2005 and Trostel et 
al. 2002 are examples of two recent studies). FB variables constitute valid instruments if they 
affect earnings only indirectly through their effect on schooling, i.e. if there is no 
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intergenerational transmission of ability. FB then enters the vector of variables in equation 
(1b) which directly influence schooling5. Alternatively, a number of studies use FB directly in 
earnings functions on the grounds that FB proxies omitted ability, school quality and out-of-
school learning environment or reflects nepotistic family connections (see Heckman and 
Hotz, 1989 in Panama; Lam and Schoeni, 1993 in Brazil; Krishnan, 1996 in Ethiopia; and 
Kingdon, 1998 in India). However, Card (1999, pp. 1825) is critical of the use of FB variables 
as controls in earnings functions: inclusion of FB in earnings functions may reduce the bias 
but will still yield an upward biased estimate of rates of return unless all of the unobserved 
components are completely absorbed in the FB variables (Card, 1999, pp. 1825-1826).  
   An alternative to the IV technique is to either use repeated observations on the same 
individual over time or observations from different individuals within the same family to 
‘difference out’ the variables generating correlation in the residuals in a ‘fixed effects’ 
approach. Arguably, at good part of the unobserved heterogeneity is common to family 
members. Consequently, differences in unobserved ability and their impact in determining 
education should be lower within rather than between families. Earnings functions can be 
estimated on twin-samples, siblings, father-son or mother-daughter pairs using a ‘fixed 
effects’ or first-differencing approach. By introducing sub-samples of households with at least 
two individuals of a given gender in wage employment (and more stringently households with 
brothers/sisters, father-son or mother-daughter pairs in wage employment) the fixed effects 
method effectively controls for all household variables that are common across these 
individuals within a given household. A simultaneous advantage of the fixed effects 
procedure is the elimination of the sample selection problem (Pitt and Rosenzweig, 1990, 
pp.978 and Behrman and Deolalikar, 1995, pp. 106).    
Card (1999) provides an excellent summary of findings from twin and sibling studies 
in developed countries. In almost all instances, fixed effects estimates of the return to 
education are smaller than naïve OLS estimates suggesting an upward bias in the latter. 
However, data differencing exacerbates ME problems in sibling studies as part of the true 
signal is differenced out within families and the return to education is biased towards zero 
(Griliches, 1979). The finding of smaller estimated returns in sibling studies gives credence to 
the suspicion that these studies suffer potentially severe attenuation bias. However, research 
in recent years overcomes measurement error problems and concludes that fixed effects 
estimates corrected for measurement error are still smaller than OLS estimates (Ashenfelter 
and Rouse, 1998, Rouse, 1999 Hertz, 2003).  
 
 
                                                 
5 Such that if individual ability is an unobservable in the error term in earnings functions (εi), family 
background instruments (Zi) must not be correlated with the error i.e. Corr (Zi, εi) = 0.   
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3. Data and Variable Specification 
The PIHS (2002) data set is used in the analysis. This data set collected information on 
employment and earnings of all males and females aged 10 and above. Earnings information 
was collected for the past month from those able to report on a monthly basis, and yearly 
earnings information for annual reporters. We restrict analysis to adults aged 15 to 65 
reporting waged-work employment. Consistent with previous literature, full-time students 
(‘currently enrolled in school’) are excluded from the sample. This yields a total of 13,519 
adult males and females aged 15-65 reporting participation in waged employment.  
Table 1 shows the distribution of the labour force by gender in Pakistan. There are 
striking gender differences in labour force participation rates: whereas 88 per cent males 
participate in the labour force, only 26 per cent of females do so. A relatively large proportion 
of males and females are engaged in self employment: 42 and 16 per cent, respectively. 
Gender differences in waged-work participation are particularly striking - 42 per cent males 
and only 7 per cent females are engaged in some form of waged employment.  
Earnings functions are fitted on the sub-sample of waged-workers i.e. 11,501 males 
and 2,018 females. Selectivity-corrected earnings functions are fitted on wage-work 
participants with the reference category (or non-participants) including all other individuals 
(i.e. the unemployed, self-employed and the non-workers). The IV estimates are based on 
sub-samples of waged-workers who 1) report information on parental education and 2) who 
are married and report spouse’s education. Finally, the household fixed effects methodology 
estimates earnings functions on sub-samples of households where at least one individual of 
each gender (male/female) is in waged employment (any relation, sibling pairs or father-
son/mother-daughter pairs)6.  
The dependent variable in the participation equation is wage or salaried employment 
(PAID_EMPLOY) and that in the earnings functions is the natural log of monthly earnings 
(LN_MONTHLY_Y). The definitions of the variables used in the participation equation and 
earnings functions are given in Table 2. The education variable has been specified in two 
different ways, as years of completed education (EDU_YRS) and as education dummy 
variables representing various levels of education (LESS_PRIMARY, PRIMARY, MIDDLE, 
MATRIC, INTER, BACHELORS and MA_MORE). The reference category for the dummy-
variables specification is individuals with no education. The vector of exclusion restrictions in 
                                                 
6 The divisions are based on the notion that ‘any’ relation may not have the same genetic ties as blood 
relations. Although our sample of ‘All’ relations in household fixed effects estimates excludes non-
blood relations such as parents-in-law and any servants residing in the household, it includes 
grandchildren. To increase the robustness of the estimates, we divide individuals into tighter groupings: 
sibling pairs (brothers and sisters) and parent-child pairs. The father-son pairs are, more specifically, 
male children of the household head. The mother-daughter pairs are the female children of spouses of 
the household head.  
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the work-participation equation includes the following demographic variables: CHILD7 = 
number of children aged 7 or less in the households; ADULT60 = number of adults aged 60 
or more in the household; MARRIED = 1 if individual is married, 0 otherwise and HEAD = 1 
if individual is the household head, 0 otherwise. 
The earnings functions include experience and its quadratic (EXP and EXP2). This 
variable is often computed as: (Age – years of schooling – 5) on the belief that individuals 
start schooling at the age of 5 and enter the labour market upon completing schooling. This 
computation can be misleading in developing countries for at least two reasons. Firstly, 
individuals do not necessarily enter school at the age of 5 and secondly, a large majority of 
the labour force is illiterate and may not have attended any formal schooling. The PIHS is 
unique in that it asks individuals who attended formal schooling, the age at which they 
entered school. For individuals with positive years of schooling, EXP is computed as (Age – 
Years of schooling – Age entered school). For individuals with zero schooling, EXP =   (Age 
– 14)7.  
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations of the variables used in the 
participation equation by gender separately for wage-work participants and non-participants. 
Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations of variables used in the earnings functions. 
The last column shows a t-test of the gender difference in the means. Table 4 suggests that in 
waged employment males earn very substantially more than females. In logs, male earnings 
are 24 per cent higher than female earnings. The disparity in earnings is more apparent from 
Table 5 which shows average monthly earnings of waged employees by gender and education 
level. At all education levels, male earnings are significantly greater than female earnings. 
The gaps in earnings are similar across education levels but are highest at BACHELORS. In 
absolute terms, on average male earnings are a massive 113 per cent higher than female 
earnings.  
Men in waged employment are not significantly more experienced than women but 
have completed significantly more years of education. Female workers report greater father’s 
education than male workers (4.4 versus 2.9 years) suggesting that women wage-workers are 
a select group in the population with more educated parents and possibly with different 
aspirations and motivations as compared to non-workers. The proportion of women workers 
who have attended private schools (PRIVATE) is also marginally significantly greater than 
those of males. As private schools in Pakistan are believed to be of better quality than 
government schools, the descriptive statistics highlight the importance of controlling for 
sample selectivity into waged-employment, especially for female workers. 
                                                 
7 The calculation of EXP tacitly assumes no grade repetition.  
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4. Econometric Results 
Earnings functions are estimated using four methods: 1) OLS, 2) the Heckman two-step, 
3) 2SLS and 4) household fixed effects. The results are divided into three sections. The first 
section reports probit estimates of waged-work participation by gender. The second presents 
OLS, Heckman, 2SLS and fixed effects estimates of earning functions. The final section 
extends the analysis by relaxing the restrictive assumption of linearity in the ‘years’ 
specification, introducing occupation and industry controls and, finally, decomposing the 
gender wage gap using Oaxaca’s (1973) method. Unless stated otherwise, equations are fitted 
separately on males and females aged 15-65 in wage-employment. 
4.1 Wage Work Participation (WP) 
Table 6 presents the results of probit estimation of waged-work participation. It is 
clear that factors determining male and female Wage-work Participation (WP) differ 
significantly. For both genders, education has a largely U-shaped relationship with WP – the 
coefficients decrease and then increase in magnitude with higher levels of education. The 
effect of education on WP is stronger for women than for men, with a larger number of 
education splines significant for females as compared to males.  
Being married has a significantly positive association with male WP, increasing the 
probability of waged work by 4 percentage points. Marriage has a significantly negative 
association for females, reducing their probability of WP by almost 3 percentage points. This 
gendered association is reflective of economic responsibility: for males, marriage increases 
financial responsibility while for females the reverse is true. Marriage and WP may also be 
jointly determined. Unearned income has a small but statistically significant negative effect 
on WP for males and females indicating a reduced need to work with alternative sources of 
income. A Priori, household demographics are expected to have a significantly larger effect 
on female WP as cultural norms in Pakistan delegate the role of ‘carers’ (of young children 
and old people) to women. However, contrary to popular expectation, a larger proportion of 
CHILD7 and ADULT60 has a significantly negative association with both male and female 
WP with the marginal effects somewhat larger for men than for women8.  
 Finally, there are interesting regional and provincial disparities in WP across genders. 
Although both males and females are significantly more likely to be waged-workers in urban 
areas than in rural, the effect is large for men (14 per cent) and tiny for women (less than 1 
per cent) suggesting that the types of employment available to men and women differ 
between urban and rural areas.   
                                                 
8 The male-female coefficients on CHILD7 are significantly different (computed Wald value = 131.6) 
but insignificant for ADULT60 (computed Wald value = 1.78).   
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4.2 Earnings Functions 
OLS and Sample Selectivity Bias (SSB) Estimates  
Ordinary Least Squares estimates of returns to education are presented in Table 7. 
Columns (a) and (c) report findings for ‘Years’ of education (EDU_YRS). Columns (b) and 
(d) depict results for education ‘Levels’. Focus on columns (a) and (c) first. The key 
parameter of interest is the point estimate on EDU_YRS – the rate of return to an additional 
year of schooling. The marginal rate of return to schooling is 7.2 per cent for males and 16.6 
per cent for females. The return to education for women is more than double that for men in 
Pakistan. A Wald test confirms that the two coefficients on EDU_YRS in (a) and (c) are 
statistically very significantly different9. This baseline result implies large and significant 
gender differences in returns to education in Pakistan. 
Turn now to columns (b) and (d) for the ‘Levels’ specification. This model relaxes 
the assumption of linearity of education implicit in columns (a) and (c). Some striking 
findings emerge. Firstly, the coefficients on education levels are positive and progressively 
increasing with higher levels of education for both genders, indicating a convex relationship 
between education and earnings. Secondly, the coefficients at all education-levels are 
significantly higher for females than for males10. The returns to additional years of education 
at various levels (Table 7a) show that returns to female education are always higher than 
returns to male education11. However, while returns increase for both males and females till 
INTER, they decline and then increase again at higher education levels for both genders, but 
more for females than for males.     
Thirdly, the increase in coefficients with education levels is much sharper for women 
than for men, suggesting that the earnings profile is more convex for females as compared to 
males12. Finally, there is a premium in returns from PRIMARY to MIDDLE for females 
(coefficients increase from 0.34 to 0.96) with the increase being substantially smaller for 
males (0.14 to 0.27).  
However, OLS estimates may be biased due to sample-selection and endogenous 
schooling. We turn next to the SSB estimates (Table 8) which correct for selection bias by 
                                                 
9 The computed Wald statistic is 185.90 which is significant at the 1 % level.  
10 Wald tests for difference in male and female coefficients on the levels of education in (b) and (d) 
result in the following computed values of the chi-square statistic: 5.1 (LESS_PRIMARY), 2.5 
(PRIMARY), 23.6 (MIDDLE), 63.7 (MATRIC), 76.4 (INTER), 97.9 (BACHELORS) and 104.2 
(MA_MORE). Except PRIMARY, all values are significant at the 5% level (critical chi2 value is 3.84). 
11 The coefficients in the ‘Levels’ specification in Table 6 have to be transformed to arrive at the 
‘returns’ as the number of years of education is different for the various levels of education indicated 
by the dummy variables and as measured here, the wage premia for a graduate of a higher level include 
the premium from a lower level of education.   
12 Interestingly, in column (d), the return to LESS_PRIMARY and PRIMARY for women is almost 
identical (34 per cent), rising to almost 96 per cent for MIDDLE schooling suggesting that for women, 
the return to acquiring any education below or up till primary schooling has a return in the labour 
market. 
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using the Heckman two-step procedure and incorporate LAMBDA into earnings function 
estimates. The selectivity-corrected earnings functions reported in Table 8 include the 
standard variables – education, experience and its square and the provincial and regional 
dummies. Household demographic variables (CHILD7, ADULT60) and LNUNEARNED_Y 
are used as exclusion restrictions. These variables are believed to determine participation in 
waged-work but do not directly affect labour market earnings. All are individually statistically 
significant.  
The LAMBDA term is large and statistically significantly negative for males (in both 
Years and Levels specifications) and significant for females only in the Years specification. A 
comparison across columns (a) and (c) and across columns (b) and (d) in Tables 7 and 8 
reveals the effect of correcting for sample selection. Inclusion of the LAMBDA term reduces 
the point estimates on years of education from 7.2 per cent to 6.4 per cent for males and 16.6 
per cent to 14.2 per cent for females. 
These differences are statistically significant13. In the Levels specification, the 
inclusion of the LAMBDA term has no significant attenuating effect on the education-
coefficients in the female sample (consistent with LAMBDA being insignificant) but in the 
male sample inclusion of LAMBDA has a significantly attenuating effect on some education-
level coefficients (BACHELORS and MA_MORE)14. Finally, specifying education in levels 
rather than as EDU_YRS has an attenuating effect on the point estimate of LAMBDA which 
falls by a larger absolute value for females as compared to males. The change in LAMBDA 
coefficients is significant for males but insignificant for females15. Overall, these findings 
suggest that OLS overestimates the return to education (especially in the Years specification).  
Importantly, however, the return to female education remains significantly greater 
than that for males even after controlling for selection bias - the marginal return to schooling 
is 6.4 per cent for males and 14.2 per cent for females (columns (a) and (c) in Table 8). As 
with simple OLS, the return to education for women is more than double that for men in 
Pakistan. This difference is statistically significant16. Experience and its square have a fairly 
standard relationship with earnings for both genders, increasing albeit at a diminishing rate. 
Earnings peak at 25 years and 31 years of experience for males and females respectively. 
Both genders earn more in urban than in rural regions. The results in the ‘Levels’ 
                                                 
13 The computed Wald statistic for the difference in EDU_YRS coefficients across the OLS and SSB 
specifications in columns (a) and (d) in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 is 13.69 for males and 4.95 for females 
suggesting we can reject the null hypothesis that the change in coefficients is equal to zero.   
14 The computed Wald statistics comparing the BACHELORS and MA_MORE coefficients across the 
OLS and SSB estimates for the males sample are 6.93 and 17.34 suggesting we cannot accept the null 
hypothesis of equality of coefficients at the 5 % level.  
15 The computed Wald statistic for males is 24.36 and for females is 3.53. The critical chi2 value at the 
5% level is 3.84 suggesting that we can reject the null hypothesis that the change in coefficients 
between the two specifications is equal to zero for males but not for females.  
16 The Wald test results in a computed value of 1183.0 which is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
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specification reported in columns (b) and (d) are consistent with the OLS findings17. Note that 
the jump in coefficients from PRIMARY to MIDDLE remains even after controlling for 
selection into waged work. 
To conclude this section, we find that the return to women’s education is significantly 
higher than to men’s, both in ‘Years’ and ‘Levels’ specifications and that the education-
earnings profile is convex for males and females in Pakistan. The first result corroborates 
some studies in Pakistan and diverges from others. The convexity result is corroborated by 
recent evidence from a number of studies from an array of countries - Kingdon (1998) and 
Kingdon and Unni (2001) on India, Belzil and Hansen (2002) for USA and Söderbom et. al. 
(2005) in Kenya and Tanzania.  
 
 Instrumental Variable Estimates  
As described above, OLS estimates of returns to education will be biased if years of 
schooling (EDU_YRS) are correlated with the error term, or if reported schooling is measured 
with error (endogeneity bias). The SSB estimates reported above may be biased upwards due 
to the classic ‘ability bias’. IV estimates are more robust than the estimates from the previous 
section on two counts: 1) they control for endogeneity of EDU_YRS, thereby correcting for 
any upward ‘ability biases’ and 2) they are unaffected by measurement error so that the 
reported findings should be purged of any attenuating effects. However, IV estimates are 
based on selected samples (earnings functions are estimated on subsets of individuals 
reporting earnings in waged work). Sample selection issues may be further compounded as a 
small sub-sample of the population reports parental education and spouse’s education, the 
instruments used here (see below). Controlling simultaneously for both sample selection 
effects and endogeneity of schooling in earnings function estimates would require an 
additional set of instruments that didn’t directly affect either earnings or participation into 
waged work, a condition often very hard to meet given data constraints (Wooldridge, 2002, 
pp. 567).      
We discussed above how previous literature has used family background variables to 
instrument for endogenous schooling18. We use parental education as instruments for the 
                                                 
17 Wald tests for difference in male and female coefficients on the levels of education in (b) and (d) 
result in the following computed values: 5.7 (LESS_PRIMARY), 2.5 (PRIMARY), 23.2 (MIDDLE), 
90.7 (MATRIC), 52.7 (INTER), 50.9 (BACHELORS) and 35. 3 (MA_MORE). Except PRIMARY, all 
values are significant at the 5% level (critical chi2 value is 3.84).  
18 As mentioned previously, a number of studies directly control for family background in earnings 
functions  on the premise that family background impacts earnings either directly through nepotism or 
indirectly through school quality or out of school learning, in which case failure to account for it may 
subject estimates to ‘family background bias’. However, this sub-section uses family background 
variables as instruments for the worker’s schooling under the assumption that there is no 
intergenerational transmission of ability and that family background affects earnings only indirectly 
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subset of individuals reporting fathers’ and mothers’ education and alternatively spouse’s 
education as an instrument for another subset of married wage-workers19. Education is 
instrumented using three variables: FEDYRS (years of education completed by worker’s 
father), MEDPRIM (equals 1 if mother has completed any year of primary education, 0 
otherwise) and MEDPRIMORE (equals 1 if mother has completed more than primary 
education, 0 otherwise)20. Mothers reporting no education (MEDNONE) are the omitted 
category. Parental education may be good instruments for own-schooling if parent’s 
education positively affects schooling but is not correlated with child ability (which is in the 
error term of the earnings function), i.e., assuming no intergenerational transmission of 
ability21. In the sample of wage-workers aged 15-65 from the PIHS (2001-2002), between 24 
and 26 per cent of the variation in education of males and females, respectively, is explained 
by father’s education22.  
The IV analysis using parental background is augmented using spouse’s education 
(SPOUSE_EDU = years of education completed by spouse) as another instrument to compare 
the findings with parental-education estimates. This draws on the theory of assortative mating 
(Weiss, 1999): individuals with common social backgrounds, religion, race and caste are 
more likely to bond together in marriage. This is accentuated by the high correlation between 
spouse’s education and own education in Pakistan (0.29 for males and 0.51 for females using 
the PIHS, 2002). Family background variables such as parental or spousal education have 
been used as instruments in previous work on rates of returns estimation. However, given the 
criticism of such variables as valid instruments, i.e. due to their possible endogeneity, the 
findings from this section will be interpreted with caution. 
    It was stressed above that instruments must be good and valid: variables that are 
correlated with education and uncorrelated with the residual in the earnings function. To 
                                                                                                                                            
through its effect on worker’s schooling. Hansen’s J statistics test confirms the relevance of the 
instruments used. 
19 These subsets may differ from the population in that individuals reporting parental or spousal 
education may belong to subsets of the population which are not random draws. This suggests a 
potential sample selection issue which we are, unfortunately, unable to deal with here.  
20 We experimented with a number of instruments for mother’s education. The set of instruments that 
satisfied the over-identification test and seemed justifiable and theoretically plausible was chosen. For 
example, in Pakistan, with a large number of mother’s reporting no education (90 per cent in the IV 
sub-sample), it made more sense to define mother’s education in terms of dummy variables capturing 
critical levels of education rather than completed years.   
21 Even assuming no intergenerational transmission of ability, these instruments cans still be criticised 
on the grounds that parental education may either have a direct effect on individual earnings in the 
labour market (nepotism and family connections) or indirectly through its effect on school quality. 
These arguments make a case for including parental education as control variables in earnings 
functions rather than using them as instruments for schooling.  
22 We also have data on maternal education for a subset of workers. However, the correlation between 
mother’s education and own-education is relatively low (7 and 15 per cent for males and females 
respectively).  
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determine the empirical ‘goodness’ of the instruments, turn to the first-stage estimates 
reported in columns (b), (d), (f) and (h) in Table 9. For both genders, the first stage equations 
reveal that FEDYRS, MEDPRIM, MEDPRIMORE and SPOUSE_EDU almost always have 
large, very precisely determined coefficients with the expected signs. The ‘relevance’ of the 
instruments can be assessed by examining the significance of the excluded instruments in the 
first-stage IV regressions. The objective of this test as suggested by Bound, Jaegar and Baker 
(1995) is to determine that education is correlated with the instruments, controlling for all 
other variables. The p-values of the F tests in the first-stage regression indicate that the 
instruments satisfy the ‘relevance’ condition very well. If the instruments used are not ‘valid’ 
i.e. if Corr(Zi,εi) ≠ 0, the IV estimates will be inconsistent. The only way to assess the validity 
of the instruments is to have a surfeit of instruments and use an over identification (OID) test. 
This is only possible for the IV-sample using parental education since we have both mother’s 
and father’s education. The Hansen’s J test of over-identifying restrictions is used. In both the 
male and female samples using parental education instruments, the p-value of the OID test 
does not reject the null hypothesis, confirming the validity of instruments used.  
2SLS estimates are reported in Table 9. Education is specified as a continuous 
variable23. The first four columns report IV estimates using parental education and 
SPOUSE_EDU for males and the latter four report those for females. Columns (b), (d), (f) 
and (h) report first-stage results. Focus first on columns (a), (c), (f) and (g), the earnings 
functions estimates. The summary statistics reveal a fairly good fit with the R2 ranging from 
0.28-0.30 for males and between 0.47-0.48 for females. The rate of return to an additional 
year of schooling is between 10 and 11 per cent for males and between 17 and 18 per cent for 
females using either instrument. The main findings are: 1) as before, the rate of return to 
education is always higher for females as compared to males and 2) consistent with the 
findings from numerous other studies, βIV (10-11 per cent for males and 17-18 per cent for 
females) is larger than βOLS (7 per cent and 17 per cent for females).   
 
 Fixed Effects Estimates  
We turn now to fixed effects estimates of returns to education. The results are based 
on sub-samples of at least one male and one female wage-worker within a household who are 
related in any way (e.g. father-daughter, mother-son, brother-sister or husband-wife) or are 
siblings (only brother-sister pairs). Table 10 depicts the fixed effects estimates: column (a) for 
‘All’ relations and (b) for sibling pairs. As before, education is measured in ‘Years’ and 
‘Levels’. The set of independent variables remains unchanged with two exceptions. A gender 
dummy (MALE) is added as the sample includes individuals of both sexes, and interaction 
                                                 
23 With few instruments per sub-sample, the ‘Levels’ specification cannot be used in 2SLS.   
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terms (EDU_YRS_MALE in ‘Years’ and LESS_PRIMARY_MALE etc. in ‘Levels’) are 
included. These capture the effect of gender on the return to education. Finally, in (a) and (b), 
OLS estimates are reported along with FE estimates for comparative reasons. 
  Focus first on the ‘Years’ specification in columns (a) and (b). The returns to male 
education have been computed as the sum of the coefficients on EDU_YRS and 
EDU_YRS_MALE (for example, in ‘All’, the coefficient on EDU_YRS = 0.14 while that on 
EDU_YRS_MALE = -0.082. The overall return for males is the sum of 0.14 and -0.082 
which equals 0.058, or approximately 6 per cent). Thus, using FE estimates, the return to 
female education is clearly substantially higher than that to male education for ‘All’ 
individuals (14 per cent for females compared to 6 per cent for males) and for ‘Siblings’ (15 
percent versus 11 per cent respectively). 
Note that the FE point estimates on EDU_YRS and EDU_YRS_MALE are lower 
than the OLS estimates, a finding consistent with previous literature24. However, although the 
FE estimates are lower, they do not collapse and are reasonably close to the OLS estimates. 
Part of the decline in estimates could be because of an upward bias in the OLS estimator due 
to omitted variables. Some part (albeit unmeasured) of the attenuation could be attributable to 
ME. Although studies such as Hertz (2003) which correct for ME in within-household 
estimators still find the within-household estimate of the return to education to be smaller 
than the corresponding OLS estimate, the correction for ME causes a rise from the un-
corrected estimate. Data constraints prevent such a correction in the current study25.   
We turn now to the ‘Levels’ specifications in (a) and (b). Firstly, it is clear that, 
except for primary education, the FE returns to female education are higher than those for 
males at all levels of education in (a) and (b). This suggests larger labour market incentives 
for females (than males) to acquire education. Secondly, the FE findings confirm that the 
convexity of the education-earnings profile in previous sections is not an artefact of 
heterogeneity. Thirdly, although evidence points to βFE < βOLS for a majority of cases in ‘All’, 
this is not true for ‘Siblings’. Finally, in both ‘All’ and ‘Siblings’ samples, the jump in returns 
from PRIMARY-MIDDLE remains for females – for example, in the ‘All’ sample, the 
coefficients for females increase from 0.126 (PRIMARY) to 0.822 (MIDDLE) while those for 
males are roughly the same for both levels of education (between 0.18 and 0.19).  
 
  
                                                 
24 Hertz (2003) in a recent study using data from South Africa, finds that whereas OLS estimates yield 
returns of about 13 per cent, the return to education is 3 per cent when using FE.  ME correction causes 
the estimates to rise to 5 per cent. Behrman and Deolalikar (1995) also find FE estimates for male and 
female workers to be significantly lower than corresponding OLS estimates. 
25 Hertz (2003) corrects for measurement error in schooling using two observations of schooling on the 
same individual. This was made possible as 13 per cent of the individuals in the sample were re-
surveyed to obtain measures of reliability of measured schooling.   
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Section Summary 
Regardless of the empirical methodology adopted, there are a number of consistent 
findings. Firstly, the estimated marginal returns to additional years of schooling are 
significantly higher for females than for males. Secondly, returns increase with higher levels 
of education, pointing to convex education-earnings profiles. Finally, the labour market 
differentially rewards males and females with relatively low education levels (primary and 
middle) – women with middle schooling are rewarded substantially more as compared to 
women with primary education. This is not true for males. 
However, a number of questions warrant investigation. The following subsections deal 
with three further issues:  
1) The convexity of education-earnings profiles evidenced so far could be an artefact of 
endogenous schooling as it is driven by results from the ‘Levels’ specification where 
we are unable to control for endogenous schooling levels. This is because of a lack of 
instruments. It is of interest to see whether the earnings profile remains convex or 
collapses into the more conventional concave shape after controlling for endogeneity; 
2)  Given evidence of a ‘collapse’ in returns to primary and low levels of schooling 
across Africa and India (Moll, 1996; Schultz, 2004), the finding of large and 
significant returns for primary and middle schooling for both genders in Pakistan is 
striking. One wonders why the returns to low-schooling-levels are so high, especially 
for women. Moreover, what drives the jump in returns from primary-middle 
schooling for females and the lack thereof for males? We investigate this issue 
further.  
3) Table 5 revealed that at all levels of education male earnings were greater than female 
earnings. The FE model in Table 10 estimated on the pooled sample also showed a 
large coefficient on the MALE dummy suggesting that one way labour markets 
favour males is by providing a wage premium to being male i.e. there could be 
differential treatment in the labour market other than through differential rewards to 
education. In order to investigate this, we decompose the total gender wage gap into 
the ‘explained’ and ‘unexplained’ portions using Oaxaca’s (1973) methodology.  
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4.3 Extended Earnings Functions  
Non-Linear Earnings Functions 
So far, the continuous specification of the earnings function (‘Years’) has assumed 
linearity in schooling (captured in EDU_YRS). The theoretical literature suggests that in fact 
the relationship between education and earnings may be concave due to diminishing returns to 
education. There is empirical support for this concavity (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). 
However, Schultz (2004, pp. 123) argues that “…there is nothing in the human capital 
framework which prescribes this [concave] pattern; returns will vary according to supply and 
demand conditions in the labour market.” In recent years, the implicit concavity of education-
earnings profiles has been challenged in studies which find returns increasing with higher 
levels of education i.e. convex profiles (see Card, 1999; Kingdon, 1998; Belzil and Hansen, 
2002; Söderbom et al., 2001; and Schultz, 2004). For the purposes of this chapter, firstly, if 
the education-earnings profile is indeed concave, imposing linearity as we have done in the 
continuous specification is too restrictive. Secondly, documenting the shape of the education-
earnings profile is important because of its potential effect on the estimation of the relative 
rates of return to schooling for women and men.  
Using the ‘Levels’ specification, we have already found some evidence of convex 
earnings profiles for males and females with sharper convexities for the latter rather than the 
former. However, OLS and SSB results in Tables 7 and 8 do not control for the possibility 
that unobserved ability may be correlated with both earnings and individual schooling within 
the ‘Levels’ framework. Hence, one wonders whether the finding of convexity is an artefact 
of endogeneity. Although the FE estimates also reveal sharply convex earnings profiles for 
males and females, they are based on smaller samples. Hence, this section introduces a 
quadratic term for years of education (EDU_YRS2) within the ‘Years’ specification to relax 
the linearity constraint previously imposed. Figure 1 below graphically illustrates the 
education-earnings profiles for males and females fitted using OLS on the sample of waged 
workers26. Clearly, female waged workers earn less than males at each level of education and 
the education-earnings profiles for both genders are convex. However, EDU_YRS and 
EDU_YRS2 underlying these depictions are potentially endogenous and we turn next to 
controlling for endogeneity of schooling in a non-linear setting.  
 
                                                 
26 The regression results underlying Figure 1 (also used for the Oaxaca decomposition) are suppressed 
due to space limitations. OLS functions were fitted for males and females with the standard regressors 
used so far as independent variables but EDU_YRS2 was incorporated to allow for non-linearity. The 
estimates were robust and corrected for clustering at the population sampling unit level.  
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The endogeneity of EDU_YRS and EDU_YRS2 is tackled using a two-stage control 
function approach. In the first stage EDU_YRS is regressed on a set of instruments (which 
include FEDYRS, MEDPRIM and MEDPRIMORE). Two equations are fitted, one each for 
the male and female sub-samples and based on these regressions, residuals are estimated. In 
the second stage, earnings functions are estimated using the residuals from the first stage as 
control variables for unobserved ability. There are two main advantages of the control 
function approach. On the one hand it allows us to control for the endogeneity of a non-linear 
variable while on the other hand it allows an identification of the correlation (if any) of the 
unobserved variables and the potentially endogenous variable. The latter is a test of 
endogeneity – if the residual term is significant, it implies that the unexplained variation in 
EDU_YRS also affects variation in earnings. If the residual term is insignificant, one can 
accept the hypothesis that the schooling variable is not endogenous.   
Table 11 reports findings from the first and second step of the control function 
estimates. Control function models can only be estimated on sub-samples of individuals 
reporting parental education and for comparative purposes, corresponding OLS estimates are 
reported on the same sub-samples. Turning to the first stage of control function estimation 
(see columns b for the males and females respectively): parental education significantly 
positively determines the years of schooling completed by an individual. However, the effect 
is stronger for females – mother’s education (MEDPRIM and MEDPRIMORE) is 
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significantly positive only in the female sample and the size of the coefficient is double that in 
the male sample.  
Column (c) reports the second stage estimates: earnings functions incorporating the 
residuals from the first stage. Whereas the residual term is negative and significant at the 1 
per cent level for males, it is insignificant for females. This suggests that although we can 
accept the null hypothesis of exogeneity of schooling for the female sample, we cannot do so 
for the male sample. Moreover, even after controlling for potential endogeneity of schooling, 
the education-earnings profiles are convex. Table 12 computes the marginal return to 
schooling for various years of completed schooling using the OLS and CF estimates and 
confirms the convexity of the education-earnings profiles. Finally, a comparison across 
columns (a) and (c) in Table 11 and in Table 12 (OLS and CF estimates), reveals that in most 
cases they are not significantly different from each other27. Consequently, in the extensions 
that follow, we report only OLS and/or SSB estimates.  
 
What explains the premium to women with middle education? 
We noticed in Tables 7, 8 and 10 that: 1) the returns to low levels of education were 
high especially for women and 2) there was a large premium to women for possession of 
middle level education and the premium was greater than that for men. We wish to investigate 
the labour market realities underlying this result. One possibility is that women’s higher 
economic benefits from education are realised through better occupational attainment or 
better industry attachment. In order to test this, we include industry and occupation dummies 
in earnings functions specifications. Findings are reported in Appendix Tables A1 and A2 and 
OLS and SSB models fitted on ‘Levels’ specifications. 
The results suggest that indeed the effect of education on earnings occurs partly by 
permitting better occupational attainment. The coefficients on OLS/SSB with controls decline 
for both males and females when occupation/industry dummies are included. However, this is 
not the only mechanism as there are large and significant direct returns to certain education 
levels (especially middle) even within occupations and industries. In particular, whereas for 
men education impacts their earnings via occupation/industry at all education levels, for 
women the effect of occupation and industry association only operates after matric28.  
                                                 
27 Wald tests comparing the male and female coefficients on EDU_YRS and EDU_YRS2 reveal the 
following computed values of the chi-square: 7.04 (EDU_YRS) and 0.125 (EDU_YRS2) for males and 
7.12 (EDU_YRS) and 0.00 (EDU_YRS2) for females. The null hypothesis that the coefficients across 
OLS and CF models are not significantly different is accepted for the quadratic term but rejected for 
the linear term (EDU_YRS) for both males and females.   
28 This is reflected by a significant Wald statistic for the OLS and SSB specifications without and with 
occupation/industry dummies for males at all education levels and the significant value for females 
only from Matric onwards. The Wald statistics comparing OLS with and without industry/occupation 
dummies for males are: 4.3 (Primary), 5.5 (Middle), 7.8 (Matric), 4.6 (Inter), 6.5 (Bachelors) and 7.4 
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Therefore, there are large and significant direct returns to women’s education at 
primary and middle levels which are not explained by occupation and industry attainment. 
This is corroborated by the raw data which shows the large increase in earnings in the 
occupations across various education levels. One plausible explanation for this finding is that 
there is a scarcity premium to women’s education in Pakistan. For example, 58 per cent of the 
wage-working women in our sample in Table 4 report having no education. Moreover, Table 
4 shows that the proportion of wage-working women with middle schooling is 3.9 per cent 
(compared to 5.2 per cent women with primary education and 12.2 per cent men with middle 
education). If there is non-substitutability of jobs (i.e. certain jobs can only be performed by 
women for example teachers in single-sex girls’ schools) or job-reservation quotas in the 
government sector, the returns to women meeting minimum education qualifications will be 
high29.  
 
 Does the labour market discriminate against women? 
This study has so far found that returns to education are significantly greater for 
women than men. This raises something of a puzzle as to why then parents allocate lower 
education to girls than boys. In this section, we investigate whether the total labour market 
return to boys is greater than to girls as a way of probing parental investment motives further.  
We decompose the male-female wage gaps using the technique proposed by Oaxaca 
(1973). OLS and selectivity-corrected earnings functions (incorporating EDU_YRS2) are 
estimated to predict earnings. The wage gap is decomposed into two components: 1) that 
explained by differences in individual characteristics and 2) the residual, unexplained portion, 
reflecting differences in earnings structure. Assume that the mean earnings of females (f) are 
Yf and those of males (m) are Ym. Mean earnings will be determined by: 
 
Yi = biXi where  i=m,f                   (3) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
(MA_MORE). For females the corresponding values are: 3.6 (Less_primary), 0.1 (Primary), 0.8 
(Middle), 15.6 (Matric), 9.8 (Inter), 28.6 (Bachelors) and 27.5 (MA_MORE). Similarly, the Wald 
statistics for the SSB estimates with and without occupation/industry dummies are: 4.2 (Primary), 5.4 
(Middle), 8.4 (Matric), 5.2 (Inter), 7.9 (Bachelors), 7.1 (MA_MORE) and for females: 0.24 
(Less_primary), 0.31 (Primary), 1.0 (Middle), 17.9 (Matric), 10.9 (Inter), 9.1 (Bachelors), 3.4 
(MA_MORE).   
29 One way to test for the reservation argument would be to include a dummy variable capturing 
whether the individual is a government or private sector employee. This variable was not available in 
the dataset. One explanation for why the jump may occur at the middle level could be because the 
teaching occupation becomes viable for women immediately after completion of middle schooling (the 
minimum stipulated requirement by the government). To test this, we defined occupations by including 
a dummy variable equalling 1 if the female reported employment as a teacher and 0 otherwise. 
However, the inclusion of the ‘TEACHER’ dummy didn’t cause a significant decline in the coefficient 
on the middle dummy. The results including TEACHER dummies are not reported. 
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where X is the vector of average characteristics of i and bi is the vector of estimated 
parameters for i. Standardising by male means, the total wage gap in mean earnings (T) can 
be divided into the explained (E) component and the unexplained (D) component as follows: 
 
T = Ym – Yf 
T = bmXm – bfXf 
T = {Xm (bm– bf)} + {bf (Xm – Xf)} 
T = E + D                    (4) 
 
Similar standardising can be achieved using female means. Using this method, one can 
decompose the total gender wage gap into the explained and unexplained components. The 
unexplained component could be seen as the extent of ‘discrimination’ in the labour market. 
However, if there are important differences in the unobserved or unmeasured characteristics 
of males and females, then the residual component cannot so validly be termed 
‘discrimination’. The Oaxaca decomposition is initially conducted using OLS. As a 
robustness check, we repeat the exercise using a household fixed-effects (FE) model on sub-
samples of at least 2 waged-workers of each gender in a given household. 
The results of the decomposition exercise are reported in Table 13. Using OLS, 
expressed in natural logs, the gross gender wage difference is 1.49. Standardising by male 
means, 0.25 of the 1.49 gender wage difference is explained by better male characteristics 
(such as higher educational attainment) while 1.25 of the gender wage gap remains 
‘unexplained’. Consequently, almost 84 per cent of the gender wage gap is unexplained. 
Standardising by female means suggests an even greater unexplained proportion (95 per cent). 
The fixed effects estimates show that an even larger proportion of the gender wage-gap is 
‘unexplained’. Fixed effects estimates provide a cleaner test since unobserved or unmeasured 
characteristic differences between males and females within the family are likely to be much 
lower than across families and the large ‘unexplained’ portion in the FE sample is indicative 
of high discrimination in the labour market.  
However, since male and female hours worked may partly account for the large 
unexplained component of the gender wage-gap, we should ideally perform the 
decomposition including hours worked in the earnings function. Although we do not have 
information on hours, we do have data on days worked in the past month. However, mean 
days worked is very similar for males and females and including that variable in the OLS and 
FE regressions causes the ‘unexplained’ component to remain virtually unchanged (the 
average estimate of discrimination is 88 per cent in the OLS and 94 per cent in the FE 
sample).  
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These estimates of ‘discrimination’ in Pakistan are large in comparison to 
international estimates. For example, estimates of the ‘unexplained’ portion of the wage gap 
range between 1-5 per cent in the UK (Zabalza and Arrufat, 1983), 12 per cent in the US 
(Choudhury, 1993) and 35-45 per cent in India (Kingdon and Unni, 2001). However, previous 
estimates in Pakistan range from 63 per cent in 1979 (Ashraf and Ashraf, 1993a), 33 per cent 
in 1985-1986 (Ashraf and Ashraf, 1993b) and between 86-96 per cent and 55-77 per cent in 
1993-1994 (Siddiqui and Siddiqui, 1998). Clearly, our findings are closest to those of the last 
study, which is also the latest past study. The findings are suggestive of a pernicious increase 
in discrimination in the labour market over time. The large apparent ‘discrimination’ would 
not only explain the low participation of women in Pakistan’s labour markets but also the 
large differentials in intra-household education expenditure allocations within households 
(Aslam and Kingdon, 2007). However, these conclusions are subject to an important caveat – 
the decomposition of the male-female earnings gap is based only on wage-earners in a 
conditional equation (conditional on being a wage earner)30.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This study seeks an answer to the following question: does the labour market explain 
lower education of girls than boys in Pakistan? If the labour market rewards women less than 
men, scarce resources may be allocated efficiently though inequitably within the household. 
This question is addressed by estimating returns to education for males and females in wage-
employment in Pakistan using household data from 2002. Four methods are used in an 
attempt to overcome limitations faced in conventional earnings function analyses: 1) OLS, 2) 
Heckman two-step, 2) 2SLS and 3) household fixed effects. The findings from all four 
methods consistently point to a sizeable gender asymmetry in returns. Females have 
significantly higher economic incentives to invest in education than males. The estimated 
return to additional years of education (EDU_YRS) ranges between 7 and 11 per cent for men 
and between 13 and 18 per cent for women. By this consideration, the labour market does not 
explain lower female schooling in Pakistan. If anything, it suggests there should be a pro-
female bias in the household decision to educate. However, the Oaxaca decomposition 
suggests a large element of potential gender discrimination in the Pakistan labour market. 
While the return to education is considerably lower for men than women, total earnings are 
dramatically higher for men than women. While a large part of the male-female earnings 
                                                 
30 The large ‘unexplained’ component in such conditional equations could be partly due to the fact that 
women’s participation is constrained by cultural factors. A decomposition of the male-female earnings 
gap based on an ‘unconditional’ sample would presumably yield a larger ‘gender gap’ with the 
likelihood that productive characteristics (education and experience etc.) would explain a greater 
proportion of the gap. 
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differential is not explained by men and women’s differing productive characteristics, one 
must be cautious in interpreting the residual unexplained earnings differential as labour 
market ‘discrimination’ since certain unobserved but relevant characteristics of men and 
women may not be controlled, such as their quality of schooling (men are more likely than 
women to have attended private schools) and certain variables may be measured with error, 
such as the years of labour market experience. 
The coexistence of high returns to education for women and gender bias against them 
in household education decisions is a puzzle that demands explanation. One potential 
explanation is that even if the return to girls’ education is higher than that to boys’ education, 
the part of the return to daughters’ education accruing to parents may be much lower than that 
accruing from a sons’ education. The PIHS (2002) shows that only 6 per cent of adult 
daughters aged over 21 reside in their parental homes, suggesting that a majority are married 
and living with in-laws/husbands. Any returns from these daughters’ education would accrue 
to the in-laws or the husband rather than to the parents. In order to investigate this explanation 
further, one would need data on transfers received by parents from their male and female 
offspring. Such data are, to our knowledge, not available.  
A second potential explanation is that our estimate of the return to education is 
misleadingly high because it is estimated on the small wage employment sector whereas a 
relatively large proportion of women in Pakistan are self employed. Estimating the return to 
education accurately in self employment is difficult because earnings in self employment 
contain a return to physical capital as well and we do not have a good measure of physical 
capital in order to enable us to isolate the pure return to human capital. Finally, a third 
possible explanation is that the opportunity costs to the household of sending girls to school is 
higher than that for boys. This may arise due to differential effects of household structure 
(such as presence of elderly or very young children) on girls and boys.  
 This study also finds sharply convex education-earnings profiles for males and 
females. These findings are robust to control functions estimates. There are several policy 
implications of convexity of the education-earnings profile. Firstly, the ‘higher returns at 
lower education levels’ argument has often been used to justify allocating funds to expand 
primary education. If indeed the returns are greater at higher education levels, the economic 
efficiency rationale for channelling these funds to primary education may be diluted. 
However, this is not to say that all rationales for funding primary schooling are eliminated: 
there is a strong case for primary education in terms of its non-market returns and also in a 
rights-based perspective. In any case, the return to primary education includes the benefit that 
it permits access to further, more lucrative, levels of education. Moreover, this conclusion is 
subject to important caveats. As mentioned above, the returns to education being estimated 
here constitute only a small part of total returns to education as they are based only on wage 
 24
employees and a very large proportion of individuals (especially women) are not in wage 
employment. Also, one cannot make judgments about the relative desirability of investment at 
different levels without introducing a direct notion of relative costs. Returns to years of 
education comparisons are not the same as returns to investment in education: it is common 
knowledge that the direct cost of university education is much greater than that at the primary 
level. Thus, returns comparisons which are designed to affect policy choice obviously have to 
take account of these cost differences.   
Secondly, and linked to the first, convexity has implications for increasing education 
inequality. If private returns to schooling increase with higher education, poorer families 
facing credit constraints, who educate their children only up to the end of primary education 
will face lower returns than richer families who educate children through to higher education. 
Consequently, the poor would be motivated to educate their children less and may also send 
only the more able children to school for whom returns are higher. In these circumstances,  
education and earnings differentials may widen both across and within families (Schultz 
2004).  
 Although the education-earnings profiles in Pakistan are convex, the returns to 
primary schooling are high compared to other developing countries. This is partly due to the 
extremely low net enrolment rate at the primary level in Pakistan. From a policy perspective, 
this may also reflect un-met demand within industry-sectors that need low-skilled labour and 
policy-makers may need to promote low-level education as well as adopt policies which 
encourage these individuals to participate in the labour market (especially women). 
Finally, we also find evidence of high wage premia to low education levels, 
especially for women in Pakistan. These large and significant direct returns to women’s 
education at primary and middle levels are not fully explained by occupation and industry 
attainment and are interpreted to reflect scarcity premia in labour markets.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Distribution of the Labour Force in Pakistan by Gender (Persons aged 15-65) 
Calculated from the PIHS (2002). Our definition of: Unemployed includes everyone reporting being jobless but seeking work, 
self employed includes all defined as: employers employing individuals, unpaid family workers, owner cultivators, share 
croppers, cultivators and livestock owners, wage employed includes all defined as paid employees while non labour force 
participants (out of labour force) are those reported as jobless and not seeking work. 
 
 
Table 2: Definition of variables used in wage-work participation and earnings functions 
 
Variable 
 
Description 
 
PAID_EMPLOY Participation in salaried/waged work during the past month 
AGE Age in years 
AGE2  Square of age 
HEAD Head of the household? Yes=1, No=0 
MARRIED Married? Yes=1, No=0 
LNUNEARNED_Y Natural Log of Unearned Income (income from boarders/lodgers, zakat, 
remittances, pensions, gifts and insurance etc.) 
CHILD7 Number of children aged 7 or less in the household 
ADULT60 Number of adults aged 60 or above in the household 
NO_EDUCATION Equals 1 if individual reports 0 years of education, 0 otherwise 
LESS_PRIMARY Individual has completed less than 5 years of education (katchi class, 1, 2,3 or 4 
years), equals 1 if has completed less than primary and equals 0 otherwise 
PRIMARY Equals 1 if individual has completed 5 years, 0 otherwise 
MIDDLE Equals 1 if  individual has completed 6, 7 or 8 years, 0 otherwise 
MATRIC Equals 1 if individual has completed 9 or 10 years, 0 otherwise 
INTER Equals 1 if individual has completed 11or 12 years, 0 otherwise 
BACHELORS Equals 1 if individual has completed 13 or 14 years, 0 otherwise 
MA_MORE Equals 1 if individual has completed 15 years of education or more, 0 otherwise 
SINDH Province is Sindh, Yes=1, No=0 
NWFP Province is NWFP, Yes=1, No=0 
BALOCHISTAN Province is Balochistan, Yes=1, No=0 
AJK Province is AJK, Yes=1, No=0 
NORTH Northern Areas, Yes=1, No=0 
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Yes=1, No=0 
Male Female Total  
Labour Force Status 
 
N % N % N % 
Unemployed  
(seeking work)  
(a) 962 3.51 949 3.23 1911 3.37 
        
Employed (b = c + 
d) 
23095 84.34 6800 23.14 29895 52.80 
Self Employed (c) 11594 42.34 4782 16.27 16376 28.85 
Wage Employed (d) 11501 42.00 2018 6.87 13519 23.81 
        
Total labour Force (e = a + b) 24057 87.85 7749 26.37 31806 56.02 
        
Out of labour force (f) 3328 12.15 21638 73.63 24966 43.98 
        
All Persons (g = e + f) 27385 100 29387 100 56772 100 
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URBAN Region is urban, Yes=1, No=0 
LAMBDA Selectivity term, inverse of Mill’s Ratio 
LN_MONTHLY_Y Natural log of monthly earnings (Rupees) of individuals in paid employment in 
the labour market 
EXP Experience (years) 
EXP2 Square of Experience 
EDU_YRS Number of years of education acquired 
EDU_YRS2 Square of years of education 
FEDYRS Father’s education (years) 
MEDPRIM Mother’s education primary or less equals 1 if mother has positive but less than 
or equal to primary education, 0 otherwise 
MEDPRIMORE Mother’s education more than primary equals 1 if mother has more than 
primary education, 0 otherwise 
SPOUSE_EDU Spouse’s (husband’s/wife’s) education (years) 
READ Equals 1 if individual can ‘read in any language with understanding’, 0 
otherwise 
WRITE Equals 1 if individual can ‘write in any language with understanding’, 0 
otherwise 
MATHS Equals 1 if individual can ‘solve simple (plus minus) sums’, 0 otherwise 
PRIVATE Equals 1 if individual attended private school in the past, 0 otherwise 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the PAID_EMPLOY Participation Function 
 
Mean Characteristics of Males Mean Characteristics of Females  
Variable Participants Non 
Participants 
All Participants Non 
Participants 
All 
PAID_EMPLOY* 1.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.420 
(0.49) 
1.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.069 
(0.25) 
AGE 33.378 
(12.14) 
34.928 
(15.18) 
34.277 
(14.01) 
32.452 
(12.01) 
33.174 
(13.81) 
33.124 
(13.70) 
AGE2 1261.457 
(906.65) 
1450.359 
(1188.09) 
1371.025 
(1082.88) 
1197.274 
(869.53) 
1291.376 
(1045.04) 
1284.914 
(1034.20) 
HEAD* 0.529 
(0.50) 
0.462 
(0.50) 
0.491 
(0.50) 
0.053 
(0.224) 
0.041 
(0.20) 
0.042 
(0.20) 
MARRIED* 0.671 
(0.47) 
0.613 
(0.49) 
0.637 
(0.48) 
0.629 
(0.48) 
0.706 
(0.46) 
0.701 
(0.46) 
LNUNEARNED_Y 2.402 
(4.09) 
2.832 
(4.44) 
2.652 
(4.31) 
2.900 
(4.39) 
3.438 
(4.73) 
3.401 
(4.70) 
CHILD7 1.785 
(1.79) 
1.951 
(1.98) 
1.881 
(1.91) 
1.654 
(1.84) 
2.011 
(1.95) 
1.987 
(1.95) 
ADULT60 0.435 
(0.65) 
0.559 
(0.71) 
0.507 
(0.69) 
0.465 
(0.66) 
0.548 
(0.71) 
0.542 
(0.71) 
LESS_PRIMARY* 0.079 
(0.27) 
0.087 
(0.28) 
0.084 
(0.28) 
0.039 
(0.19) 
0.036 
(0.19) 
0.036 
(0.19) 
PRIMARY* 0.097 
(0.30) 
0.104 
(0.31) 
0.101 
(0.30) 
0.052 
(0.22) 
0.070 
(0.25) 
0.068 
(0.25) 
MIDDLE* 0.122 
(0.33) 
0.134 
(0.34) 
0.129 
(0.33) 
0.039 
(0.19) 
0.052 
(0.22) 
0.051 
(0.22) 
MATRIC* 0.168 
(0.37) 
0.167 
(0.37) 
0.167 
(0.37) 
0.100 
(0.30) 
0.066 
(0.25) 
0.068 
(0.25) 
INTER* 0.065 
(0.25) 
0.051 
(0.22) 
0.057 
(0.23) 
0.062 
(0.24) 
0.025 
(0.16) 
0.027 
(0.16) 
BACHELORS* 0.058 
(0.23) 
0.029 
(0.17) 
0.041 
(0.20) 
0.070 
(0.25) 
0.015 
(0.12) 
0.019 
(0.14) 
MA_MORE* 0.050 
(0.22) 
0.016 
(0.13) 
0.030 
(0.17) 
0.058 
(0.23) 
0.004 
(0.06) 
0.007 
(0.09) 
SINDH* 0.302 
(0.46) 
0.241 
(0.43) 
0.267 
(0.44) 
0.353 
(0.48) 
0.233 
(0.42) 
0.241 
(0.43) 
NWFP* 0.137 
(0.34) 
0.171 
(0.38) 
0.157 
(0.36) 
0.075 
(0.26) 
0.193 
(0.39) 
0.185 
(0.39) 
BALOCHISTAN* 0.165 
(0.37) 
0.164 
(0.37) 
0.140 
(0.35) 
0.085 
(0.28) 
0.128 
(0.33) 
0.125 
(0.33) 
AJK* 0.032 
(0.18) 
0.028 
(0.16) 
0.029 
(0.17) 
0.027 
(0.16) 
0.042 
(0.20) 
0.041 
(0.20) 
NORTH* 0.011 
(0.10) 
0.034 
(0.18) 
0.024 
(0.15) 
0.005 
(0.07) 
0.029 
(0.17) 
0.027 
(0.16) 
 32
FATA* 0.012 
(0.11) 
0.020 
(0.14) 
0.017 
(0.13) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.019 
(0.14) 
0.017 
(0.13) 
URBAN* 0.473 
(0.50) 
0.323 
(0.47) 
0.386 
(0.49) 
0.501 
(0.50) 
0.355 
(0.48) 
0.366 
(0.48) 
       
N 11501 15884 27385 2018 27369 29387 
       
Note: The variables with superscript (*) are binary 0/1 variables and their means represent the proportions of ones in the sample. 
Standard Deviations are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Variables used in Earnings functions, Aged 15-65 in Waged 
Work  
 
Average value 
of Variable: 
 
 
Males 
 
 
N 
 
Females 
 
N 
 
t-test (M – F) 
LN_MONTHLY_Y 7.783 
(0.01) 
11501 6.284 
(0.03) 
2018 66.68 
EXP 20.492 
(0.12) 
11501 20.097 
(12.79) 
2018 1.30 
EXP2 577.429 
(5.98) 
11501 567.414 
(14.09) 
2018 0.65 
EDU_YRS 5.666 
(0.05) 
11501 4.326 
(0.13) 
2018 10.32 
EDU_YRS2   60.295 
(0.70) 
11501 51.925 
(1.82) 
2018 4.53 
NO_EDUCATION 0.361 
(0.00) 
11501 0.581 
(0.01) 
2018 -18.92 
LESS_PRIMARY 0.079 
(0.00) 
11501 0.039 
(0.00) 
2018 6.42 
PRIMARY 0.097 
(0.00) 
11501 0.052 
(0.00) 
2018 6.57 
MIDDLE 0.122 
(0.00) 
11501 0.039 
(0.00) 
2018 11.12 
MATRIC 0.169 
(0.00) 
11501 0.100 
(0.01) 
2018 7.78 
INTER 0.065 
(0.00) 
11501 0.062 
(0.01) 
2018 0.58 
BACHELORS 0.058 
(0.00) 
11501 0.070 
(0.01) 
2018 -2.16 
MA_MORE 0.050 
(0.00) 
11501 0.058 
(0.01) 
2018 -1.58 
FEDYRS 2.865 
(4.19) 
4155 4.380 
(4.91) 
493 -7.78 
MEDPRIM 0.057 
(0.00) 
4155 0.075 
(0.01) 
493 -1.65 
MEDPRIMORE 0.040 
(0.00) 
4155 0.061 
(0.01) 
493 -2.21 
SPOUSE_EDU 2.059 
(0.05) 
5638 4.559 
(0.17) 
943 -16.68 
Notes: 1) Standard errors are in parentheses beneath the mean values of the variables, 2) Descriptive statistics computed 
excluding any individuals in paid employment who are currently enrolled in school. NO_EDUCATION is the reference category 
for education splines.  
 
 
Table 5: Average Monthly Earnings of Wage Employees, by Education Level and Gender 
 
Education Level/Gender 
 
 
MALE 
(a) 
 
FEMALE 
(b) 
 
GAP (M-F) 
(c = a – b) 
 
t-test (M-F) 
(d) 
 
F/M 
(e = b/a) 
NO_EDUCATION 2271.5 
(19.04) 
581.3 
(23.14) 
1690.2 -44.62 0.26 
LESS_PRIMARY 2258.7 
(46.52) 
732.1 
(118.16) 
1526.6 -9.40 0.32 
PRIMARY 2539.7 709.0 1830.7 -10.54 0.28 
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(52.28) (91.71) 
MIDDLE 2599.0 
(43.23) 
1054.0 
(154.01) 
1545.0 -8.26 0.41 
MATRIC 3242.5 
(45.00) 
2127.5 
(127.57) 
1115.0 -7.67 0.66 
INTER 4109.6 
(100.11) 
2512.9 
(163.71) 
1597.7 -6.27 0.61 
BACHELORS 5845.0 
(165.40) 
3818.5 
(245.64) 
2026.5 -5.39 0.65 
MA_MORE 8521.9 
(282.55) 
6518.3 
(301.11) 
2003.6 -3.13 0.76 
ALL 
 
3136.3 
(26.41) 
1456.8 
(48.50) 
1664.7 -25.25 0.46 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses beneath the mean values of the variables 
 
 
Table 6: Binary Probit Estimates of Waged Work Participation (15-65), by Gender 
Males Females  
Variable Coefficient t-value Marginal 
Effect 
Coefficient t-value Marginal 
Effect 
CONSTANT -1.485 -20.88 *** - -2.281 -22.14 *** - 
AGE 0.073 17.10 *** 0.029 0.066 10.18 *** 0.006 
AGE2 -0.001 -21.56 *** 0.000 -0.001 -10.35 *** 0.000 
LESS_PRIMARY -0.001 -0.03  0.000 0.057 0.91  0.006 
PRIMARY -0.035 -1.26  -0.014 -0.159 -3.11 *** -0.014 
MIDDLE -0.046 -1.77 * -0.018 -0.150 -2.53 ** -0.013 
MATRIC -0.031 -1.30  -0.012 0.201 4.58 *** 0.023 
INTER 0.054 1.53  0.021 0.421 7.21 *** 0.056 
BACHELORS 0.256 6.17 *** 0.101 0.733 11.69 *** 0.123 
MA_MORE 0.494 10.02 *** 0.195 1.504 16.81 *** 0.380 
HEAD 0.204 8.59 *** 0.079 0.169 2.82 *** 0.019 
MARRIED 0.113 4.58 *** 0.044 -0.267 -8.55 *** -0.029 
LNUNEARNED_Y -0.004 -2.10 ** -0.002 -0.011 -3.71 *** -0.001 
CHILD7 -0.041 -9.00 *** -0.016 -0.014 -2.02 * -0.001 
ADULT60 -0.069 -5.59 *** -0.027 -0.040 -2.21 ** -0.004 
SINDH 0.234 11.45 *** 0.092 0.096 3.41 *** 0.010 
NWFP 0.001 0.05  0.000 -0.535 -12.75 *** -0.040 
BALOCHISTAN 0.312 12.38 *** 0.123 -0.276 -6.58 *** -0.023 
AJK 0.249 5.19 *** 0.099 -0.342 -4.76 *** -0.026 
NORTH -0.630 -10.60 *** -0.217 -0.771 -6.22 *** -0.041 
FATA -0.024 -0.37  -0.009 - - - - 
URBAN 0.363 21.44 *** 0.142 0.080 3.02 *** 0.008 
         
Log L -17398.48                     -6875.81                       
Pseudo-R2 0.071 0.080 
N (Un-Censored) 27385 29387 
Note: *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The dependent variable is 
PAID_EMPLOY which equals 1 if individual is in paid employment and 0 otherwise. (-) indicates no observations. 
NO_EDUCATION is reference category for education splines, PUNJAB for provinces.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7: OLS Mincerian Earnings Functions, (Males and Females), with years of Education and 
Levels of Education 
Males (15-65) Females (15-65) 
Years 
(a) 
Levels 
(b) 
Years 
(c) 
Levels 
(d) 
 
Variable 
Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  
CONSTANT 6.223 
(0.03) 
*** 6.357 
(0.03) 
*** 4.188 
(0.12) 
*** 4.307 
(0.13) 
*** 
EDU_YRS 0.072 
(0.00) 
*** 
- 
 0.166 
(0.01) 
***  
- 
*** 
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EXP 0.076 
(0.00) 
*** 0.075 
(0.00) 
*** 0.073 
(0.01) 
*** 0.068 
(0.01) 
*** 
EXP2 -0.001 
(0.00) 
*** -0.001 
(0.00) 
*** -0.001 
(0.00) 
*** -0.001 
(0.00) 
*** 
LESS_PRIMARY -  0.011 
(0.03)  
-  0.334 
(0.14) 
** 
PRIMARY -  0.136 
(0.02) 
*** -  0.342 
(0.13) 
** 
MIDDLE -  0.271 
(0.02) 
*** -  0.958 
(0.14) 
*** 
MATRIC -  0.534 
(0.02) 
*** -  1.505 
(0.12) 
*** 
INTER -  0.762 
(0.03) 
*** -  1.843 
(0.12) 
*** 
BACHELORS -  1.070 
(0.03) 
*** -  2.294 
(0.11) 
*** 
MA_MORE -  1.371 
(0.03) 
*** -  2.909 
(0.11) 
*** 
SINDH 0.205 
(0.02) 
*** 0.188 
(0.02) 
*** 0.281 
(0.09) 
*** 0.269 
(0.09) 
*** 
NWFP -0.060 
(0.03) 
** -0.078 
(0.03) 
*** 0.494 
(0.11) 
*** 0.479 
(0.11) 
*** 
BALOCHISTAN 0.423 
(0.03) 
*** 0.386 
(0.03) 
*** 0.664 
(0.13) 
*** 0.643 
(0.13) 
*** 
AJK 0.165 
(0.04) 
*** 0.174 
(0.04) 
*** 0.711 
(0.14) 
*** 0.681 
(0.15) 
*** 
NORTH 0.216 
(0.05) 
*** 0.204 
(0.05) 
*** 1.370 
(0.32) 
*** 1.392 
(0.32) 
*** 
FATA 0.124 
(0.06) 
** 0.096 
(0.06) 
  
- 
 
- 
 
URBAN 0.200 
(0.02) 
*** 0.204 
(0.02) 
*** 0.487 
(0.09) 
*** 0.503 
(0.09) 
*** 
         
R2 0.388 0.408 0.472 0.478 
N 11501 11501 2018 2018 
Mean (Dep. Var) 7.783 7.783 6.284 6.284 
Note: *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The dependent variable is 
LN_MONTHLY_Y. Standard errors are in parentheses. (-) indicates no observations. NO_EDUCATION is reference category 
for education splines, PUNJAB for provinces. 
 
Table 7a: Rates of Returns to additional years of education (Males and Females) at various levels 
of education 
Rates of return (%)  
LEVEL OF EDUCATION 
 
Males Females 
PRIMARY 2.7 6.8 
MIDDLE 4.5 20.5 
MATRIC 13.2 27.4 
INTER 11.4 16.9 
BACHELORS 15.4 22.6 
MA_MORE 15.1 30.7 
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Table 8: Heckman corrected Mincerian Earnings Functions, (Males and Females), Years of 
Education and Levels of Education 
Males (15-65) Females (15-65) 
Years 
(a) 
Levels 
(b) 
Years 
(c) 
Levels 
(d) 
 
Variable 
Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  
CONSTANT 7.295 
(0.08) 
*** 6.908 
(0.08) 
*** 5.227 
(0.29) 
*** 4.310 
(0.46) 
*** 
EDU_YRS 0.064 
(0.00) 
*** - - 0.142 
(0.01) 
*** - - 
EXP 0.049 
(0.00) 
*** 0.060 
(0.00) 
*** 0.062 
(0.01) 
*** 0.068 
(0.01) 
*** 
EXP2 -0.001 
(0.00) 
*** -0.001 
(0.00) 
*** -0.001 
(0.00) 
*** -0.001 
(0.00) 
*** 
LESS_PRIMARY - - 0.020 
(0.02) 
 - - 0.334 
(0.13) 
*** 
PRIMARY - - 0.149 
(0.02) 
***  - 0.343 
(0.12) 
*** 
MIDDLE - - 0.283 
(0.02) 
*** - - 0.958 
(0.14) 
*** 
MATRIC - - 0.533 
(0.02) 
*** - - 1.504 
(0.10) 
*** 
INTER - - 0.732 
(0.03) 
*** - - 1.842 
(0.15) 
*** 
BACHELORS - - 0.991 
(0.03) 
*** - - 2.293 
(0.18) 
*** 
MA_MORE - - 1.246 
(0.03) 
*** - - 2.908 
(0.28) 
*** 
SINDH 0.085 
(0.02) 
*** 0.127 
(0.02) 
*** 0.239 
(0.06) 
*** 0.269 
(0.06) 
*** 
NWFP -0.053 
(0.02) 
** -0.070 
(0.02) 
*** 0.695 
(0.11) 
*** 0.479 
(0.14) 
*** 
BALOCHISTAN 0.257 
(0.02) 
*** 0.303 
(0.02) 
*** 0.778 
(0.10) 
*** 0.643 
(0.11) 
*** 
AJK 0.062 
(0.04) 
 0.117 
(0.04) 
*** 0.848 
(0.17) 
*** 0.681 
(0.17) 
*** 
NORTH 0.567 
(0.06) 
*** 0.395 
(0.06) 
*** 1.786 
(0.37) 
*** 1.393 
(0.40) 
*** 
FATA 0.160 
(0.06) 
*** 0.122 
(0.05) 
** - - - - 
URBAN 0.027 
(0.02) 
*** 0.111 
(0.02) 
*** 0.443 
(0.06) 
 
*** 
0.503 
(0.06) 
*** 
LAMBDA -0.756 
(0.05) 
*** -0.407 
(0.05) 
*** -0.472 
(0.12)   
*** -0.001 
(0.22) 
 
 
N_UNCENSORED 
WALD_CHI2 
PVALUE (WALD) 
 
11501 
3836.09 
0.000 
 
11501 
5144.57 
0.000 
 
2018 
1297.56 
0.000 
 
2018 
1901.26 
0.000 
Note: *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The dependent variable is 
LN_MONTHLY_Y. Standard errors are in parentheses. (-) indicates no observations. NO_EDUCATION is reference category 
for education splines, PUNJAB for provinces. 
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Table 9: Instrumental Variable Earning Functions Estimates (Males and Females), using years of Education 
Males (15-65) Females (15-65) 
IV  
(PARENTAL 
EDUCATION) 
(a) 
 
First Stage 
 
(b) 
IV 
(SPOUSE_EDU) 
 
(c) 
 
First Stage 
 
(d) 
IV 
 (PARENTAL 
EDUCATION) 
(e) 
 
First Stage 
 
(f) 
IV  
(SPOUSE_EDU) 
 
(g) 
 
First Stage 
 
(h) 
 
 
Variable 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
CONSTANT 5.894 
(0.08) 
*** 7.516 
(0.24) 
*** 6.216 
(0.08) 
*** 9.755 
(0.37) 
*** 
 
 4.623 
(0.76) 
 4.432 
(0.28) 
*** 3.647 
(0.75) 
*** 
EDU_YRS 0.099 
(0.01) 
*** -  0.106 
(0.00) 
*** -  0.169 
(0.03) 
*** -  0.176 
(0.01) 
*** -  
EXP 0.102 
(0.01) 
*** -0.473 
(0.03) 
*** 0.064 
(0.00) 
*** -0.317 
(0.02) 
*** 0.154 
(0.03) 
*** -0.422 
(0.10) 
*** 0.037 
(0.02) 
* -0.232 
(0.06) 
*** 
EXP2 -0.02 
(0.00) 
*** 0.010 
(0.00) 
*** -0.001 
(0.00) 
*** 0.003 
(0.00) 
*** -0.003 
(0.00) 
*** 0.008 
(0.00) 
*** 0.000 
(0.00) 
 0.003 
(0.00) 
** 
SINDH 0.225 
(0.03) 
*** 0.381 
(0.16) 
** 0.188 
(0.03) 
*** -0.011 
(0.15) 
 0.230 
(0.13) 
* -0.062 
(0.59) 
 0.345 
(0.11) 
*** -0.658 
(0.25) 
*** 
NWFP -0.103 
(0.04) 
** 0.941 
(0.20) 
*** 0.006 
(0.03) 
 0.375 
(0.19) 
* -0.077 
(0.25) 
 3.823 
(0.96) 
*** 0.775 
(0.14) 
*** 0.919 
(0.49) 
* 
BALOCHISTAN 0.486 
(0.04) 
*** -0.092 
(0.19) 
 0.403 
(0.03) 
*** 0.174 
(0.18) 
 0.728 
(0.26) 
*** 1.103 
(1.14) 
 0.656 
(0.14) 
*** -0.854 
(0.44) 
* 
AJK 0.029 
(0.07) 
 1.573 
(0.36) 
*** 0.215 
(0.05) 
*** 1.273 
(0.35) 
*** 0.165 
(0.25) 
 5.366 
(0.90) 
*** 1.231 
(0.20) 
*** 1.533 
(0.92) 
* 
NORTH 0.162 
(0.08) 
** 0.668 
(0.63) 
 0.208 
(0.06) 
*** 1.399 
(0.56) 
** -  -  1.623 
(0.26) 
*** -0.302 
(1.43) 
 
FATA 0.169 
(0.09) 
* -1.596 
(0.59) 
*** 0.142 
(0.09) 
 -0.160 
(0.53) 
 -  -  -  -  
URBAN 
 
0.096 
(0.03) 
*** 0.657 
(0.13) 
*** 0.164 
(0.02) 
*** 1.396 
(0.13) 
*** 0.324 
(0.19) 
* 3.745 
(0.59) 
*** 0.572 
(0.11) 
*** 1.919 
(0.25) 
*** 
FEDYRS -  0.491 
(0.02) 
*** -  -  -  0.360 
(0.06) 
*** -  -  
MEDPRIM -  0.526 
(0.29) 
     -  2.067 
(0.69) 
***     
MEDPRIMORE -  1.397 
(0.35) 
***     -  2.486 
(0.99) 
**     
SPOUSE_EDU -  -  -  0.584 
(0.02) 
*** -  -  -  0.587 
(0.02) 
*** 
                 
R2 
N 
F-Test of Excl. Instruments 
P-value (F test) 
0.282 
4155 
- 
- 
0.323 
4155 
258.62 
0.000 
0.303 
5590 
- 
- 
0.383 
5590 
1305.46 
0.000 
0.458 
493 
- 
- 
0.510 
493 
23.48 
0.000 
0.478 
903 
- 
- 
0.578 
903 
610.60 
0.000 
Over-identification Test - 4.69 - -  2.37 -  
P-value (Over-id Test) - 0.100 - -  0.306   
Note: *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust and corrected for clustering at PSU level. The dependent variable is LN_MONTHLY_Y. (-) 
indicates no observations or not used. PUNJAB is the base category for provinces and MEDNONE (=1 if mother has no education, 0 otherwise) is the base for mothers’ educational dummies – MEDPRIM =1 mother has primary 
or less education (but more than 0) and 0 otherwise, MEDPRIMORE =1 if mother has more than primary education, 0 otherwise.  
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Table 10: Fixed Effects Estimates of Earnings Functions, Males and Females (15-65), Years and 
Levels of Education  
All 
(a) 
Siblings (Brother/Sister) 
(b) 
Years 
 
Levels Years Levels 
 
Variable 
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
CONSTANT 4.432 
(0.08)*** 
4.879 
(0.09)*** 
4.587 
(0.08)*** 
5.132 
(0.08)*** 
4.057 
(0.20)*** 
4.143 
(0.26)*** 
4.354 
(0.21)*** 
 
EDU_YRS 0.165 
(0.01)*** 
0.140 
(0.01)*** 
- - 0.155 
(0.01)*** 
0.153 
(0.02)*** 
- - 
EDU_YRS_MALE -0.093 
(0.01)*** 
-0.082 
(0.01)*** 
- - -0.049 
(0.02)*** 
-0.043 
(0.02)*** 
- - 
MALE 1.659 
(0.05)*** 
1.630 
(0.05)*** 
1.680 
(0.06)*** 
1.628 
(0.06)*** 
1.138 
(0.15)*** 
1.105 
(0.15)*** 
1.173 
(0.17)*** 
1.245 
(0.18)*** 
EXP 0.073 
(0.01)*** 
0.072 
(0.01)*** 
0.067 
(0.06)*** 
0.069 
(0.01)*** 
0.179 
(0.03)*** 
0.213 
(0.03)*** 
0.167 
(0.03)*** 
0.222 
(0.03)*** 
EXP2 -0.001 
(0.00)*** 
-0.001 
(0.00)*** 
-0.001 
(0.00)*** 
-0.001 
(0.00)*** 
-0.004 
(0.00)*** 
-0.005 
(0.00)*** 
-0.004 
(0.001)*** 
-0.01 
(0.001)*** 
LESS_PRIMARY - - 0.196 
(0.15) 
0.218 
(0.18) 
- - 0.443 
(0.30) 
0.802 
(0.35)** 
PRIMARY - - 0.126 
(0.12) 
0.050 
(0.15) 
- - 0.110 
(0.292) 
0.150 
(0.37) 
MIDDLE - - 0.822 
(0.14) 
0.707 
(0.17)*** 
- - 0.522 
(0.24)** 
1.010 
(0.32)*** 
MATRIC - - 1.359 
(0.10)*** 
1.204 
(0.13)*** 
- - 0.957 
(0.22)*** 
1.376 
(0.29)*** 
INTER - - 1.742 
(0.12)*** 
1.637 
(0.16)*** 
- - 1.498 
(0.22)*** 
1.777 
(0.30)*** 
BACHELORS - - 2.306 
(0.11)*** 
2.060 
(0.15)*** 
- - 2.078 
(0.22)*** 
2.163 
(0.30)*** 
MA_MORE - - 3.012 
(0.12)*** 
2.767 
(0.19)*** 
- - 2.809 
(0.23)*** 
2.752 
(0.37)*** 
LESS_PRIMARY_MALE - - -0.202 
(0.17) 
-0.170 
(0.21) 
- - -0.528 
(0.39) 
-0.927 
(0.44)** 
PRIMARY_MALE - - 0.051 
(0.15) 
0.139 
(0.18) 
- - 0.097 
(0.37) 
-0.071 
(0.43) 
MIDDLE_MALE - - -0.669 
(0.16)*** 
-0.532 
(0.18)** 
- - -0.060 
(0.31) 
-0.401 
(0.35) 
MATRIC_MALE - - -0.888 
(0.12)*** 
-0.776 
(0.14)*** 
- - -0.311 
(0.28) 
-0.571 
(0.31)* 
INTER_MALE - - -1.051 
(0.16)*** 
-0.956 
(0.18)*** 
- - -0.728 
(0.32)** 
-0.911 
(0.35)*** 
BACHELORS_MALE - - -1.260 
(0.15)*** 
-1.080 
(0.16)*** 
- - -0.548 
(0.32)* 
-0.223 
(0.37) 
MA_MORE_MALE - - -1.632 
(0.16)*** 
-1.546 
(0.16)*** 
- - -0.976 
(0.33)*** 
-0.978 
(0.34)*** 
SINDH 0.205 
(0.04)*** 
- 0.196 
(0.04)*** 
- 0.181 
(0.10)* 
- 0.147 
(0.10) 
- 
NWFP 0.171 
(0.071)** 
- 0.150 
(0.07)** 
- -0.145 
(0.17) 
- -0.166 
(0.17) 
- 
BALOCHISTAN 0.400 
(0.070)*** 
- 0.369 
(0.07)*** 
- 0.481 
(0.20)** 
- 0.397 
(0.20)* 
- 
AJK 0.422 
(0.124)*** 
- 0.371 
(0.12)** 
- 0.007 
(0.21) 
- -0.093 
(0.21) 
- 
NORTH 0.472 
(0..324) 
- 0.535 
(0.32)* 
- - 
 
- - 
 
- 
FATA - - - - - - - - 
URBAN 
 
0.293 
(0.04)*** 
- 0.320 
(0.04)*** 
- 0.226 
(0.10)** 
- 0.279 
(0.10)*** 
- 
         
N 2423 2423 2423 2423 437 437 437 437 
No. Groups - 948 - 948 - 160 - 160 
R2 0.551 0.522 0.567 0.541 0.522 0.501 0.560 0.528 
         
Note: *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The dependent variable is 
LN_MONTHLY_Y. (-) indicates no observations or not used. NO_EDUCATION is reference category for education splines, 
PUNJAB for provinces.  
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Table 11: OLS and Control Function Estimates of the Returns to Schooling, Males and Females (15-65) 
 
MALES (15-65) FEMALES (15-65) 
OLS CONTROL FUNCTION OLS CONTROL FUNCTION 
LN_MONTHLY_Y STEP 1: EDU_YRS Step 2: LN_MONTHLY_Y LN_MONTHLY_Y Step 1: EDU_YRS Step 2: LN_MONTHLY_Y 
 
 
VARIABLE 
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
CONSTANT 6.271 
(0.05) *** 
7.516 
(0.28) *** 
6.114 
(0.08) *** 
4.284 
(0.20) *** 
4.576 
(0.76) *** 
4.275 
(0.26) *** 
EDU_YRS -0.001 
(0.01)  
-  0.019 
(0.01) * 
0.044 
(0.04)  
-  0.045 
(0.05)  
EDU_YRS2 0.006 
(0.00) *** 
-  0.005 
(0.00) *** 
0.007 
(0.00) *** 
-  0.007 
(0.00) *** 
EXP 0.086 
(0.01) *** 
-0.473 
(0.03) *** 
0.096 
(0.01) *** 
0.128 
(0.02) *** 
-0.419 
(0.10) *** 
0.129 
(0.03) *** 
EXP2 -0.002 
(0.00) *** 
0.010 
(0.00) *** 
-0.002 
(0.00) *** 
-0.002 
(0.00)  
0.009 
(0.00) *** 
-0.002 
(0.00) *** 
SINDH 0.202 
(0.03) *** 
0.381 
(0.24)  
0.198 
(0.03) *** 
0.202 
(0.13)  
-0.097 
(0.59)  
0.201 
(0.13)  
NWFP -0.110 
(0.04) ** 
0.941 
(0.27) *** 
-0.116 
(0.04) *** 
0.040 
(0.25)  
3.786 
(0.96) *** 
0.035 
(0.25)  
BALOCHISTAN 0.424 
(0.04) *** 
-0.092 
(0.31)  
0.439 
(0.04) *** 
0.753 
(0.28) *** 
1.076 
(1.14)  
0.751 
(0.29) *** 
AJK 0.079 
(0.07)  
1.573 
(0.42) *** 
0.055 
(0.07)  
0.325 
(0.21)  
5.313 
(0.91) *** 
0.317 
(0.25)  
NORTH 0.148 
(0.08) * 
0.668 
(0.74)  
0.153 
(0.08) ** 
2.554 
(0.22) *** 
-6.980 
(0.95) *** 
2.560 
(0.26) *** 
FATA 0.076 
(0.08) *** 
-1.596 
(0.67) ** 
0.110 
(0.08)  
-  -  -  
URBAN 0.134 
(0.03)  
0.657 
(0.20) *** 
0.108 
(0.03) *** 
0.455 
(0.15) *** 
3.769 
(0.59) *** 
0.449 
(0.20) ** 
FEDYRS -  0.491 
(0.02) *** -  
-  0.364 
(0.06) *** -  
MEDPRIM -  0.526 
(0.33)  
-  -  2.066 
(0.69) *** - 
 
MEDPRIMORE -  1.397 
(0.32)  
-  -  2.454 
(0.99) ** - 
 
RESIDUAL -  -  -0.020 
(0.01) *** 
-  -  -0.002 
(0.03)  
             
N 4155  4155  4155  493  493  493  
R2 0.329  0.323  0.331  0.484  0.510  0.484  
Note:  Significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level is indicated by  *** , ** and  * respectively. All other variables are as defined before. The instrument variables are FEDYRS,MEDPRIM and 
MEDPRIMORE. 
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Table 12: Marginal returns to education (OLS and CF) 
Males Females Marginal Return to 
education at --- years of 
education: OLS CF OLS CF 
6 7.1 7.9 12.8 12.9 
10 11.9 11.9 18.4 18.5 
12 14.3 13.9 21.2 21.3 
14 16.7 15.9 24.0 24.1 
 
 
 
Table 13: Oaxaca Decomposition (OLS and FE) 
Males Females 
Standardising by Male Means Standardising by Female Means 
 
Based on the OLS  Estimates 
Characteristics 
(E) 
Coefficients 
(D) 
Combined 
(T) 
Characteristics 
(E) 
Coefficients 
(D) 
Combined 
(T) 
INTERCEPT 0.000 2.062 2.062 0.000 2.062 2.062 
EDU_YRS 0.123 -0.479 -0.356 0.010 -0.366 -0.356 
EDU_YRS2 0.044 -0.030 0.014 0.040 -0.026 0.014 
EXP 0.027 0.105 0.132 0.029 0.103 0.132 
EXP2 -0.009 -0.096 -0.105 -0.011 -0.094 -0.105 
SINDH -0.014 -0.024 -0.038 -0.009 -0.028 -0.038 
NWFP 0.030 -0.077 -0.047 -0.005 -0.042 -0.047 
BALOCHISTAN 0.052 -0.044 0.009 0.031 -0.023 0.009 
AJK 0.004 -0.018 -0.014 0.001 -0.015 -0.014 
NORTH 0.009 -0.014 -0.005 0.001 -0.006 -0.005 
FATA 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
URBAN -0.014 -0.139 -0.153 -0.006 -0.147 -0.153 
TOTAL 0.253 1.247 1.499 0.083 1.417 1.499 
Explained by 
Coefficients 
 
83 % 
 
95 % 
Average Estimate of discrimination 89 % 
Males Females 
Standardising by Male Means Standardising by Female Means 
 
Based on the FE Estimates 
Characteristics 
(E) 
Coefficients 
(D) 
Combined 
(T) 
Characteristics 
(E) 
Coefficients 
(D) 
Combined 
(T) 
INTERCEPT 1.403 0.000 1.403 1.403 0.000 1.403 
EDU_YRS 0.277 -0.097 0.179 0.198 -0.018 0.179 
EDU_YRS2 -0.311 0.095 -0.216 -0.254 0.038 -0.216 
EXP 0.384 0.040 0.424 0.362 0.062 0.424 
EXP2 -0.108 -0.015 -0.123 -0.104 -0.019 -0.123 
TOTAL 1.645 0.023 1.668 1.606 0.062 1.668 
Explained by 
Coefficients 
 
98 % 
 
96 % 
Average Estimate of discrimination 97 % 
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Appendices  
 
 Appendix Table A1: Earnings Functions with Occupation/Industry, Males (15-65)  
OLS W/O 
(a) 
OLS WITH 
(b) 
SSB W/O 
(c) 
SSB WITH 
(d) 
 
VARIABLE 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
CONSTANT 6.357 
(0.03) 
*** 6.608 
(0.04) 
*** 6.908 
(0.08) 
*** 7.214 
(0.08) 
*** 
 
EXP  0.075 
(0.00) 
*** 0.072 
(0.00) *** 
0.060 
(0.00) 
*** 0.056 
(0.00) 
 
EXP2 -0.001 
(0.00) 
*** -0.001 
(0.00) *** 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
*** -0.001 
(0.00) 
*** 
LESS_PRIMARY 0.011 
(0.03)  
-0.028 
(0.03)  
0.020 
(0.02) 
 -0.019 
(0.02) *** 
PRIMARY 0.136 
(0.02) 
*** 0.077 
(0.02) *** 
0.149 
(0.02) 
*** 0.091 
(0.02) *** 
MIDDLE 0.271 
(0.02) 
*** 0.205 
(0.02) *** 
0.283 
(0.02) 
*** 0.217 
(0.02) *** 
MATRIC 0.534 
(0.02) 
*** 0.455 
(0.02) *** 
0.533 
(0.02) 
*** 0.451 
(0.02) *** 
INTER 0.762 
(0.03) 
*** 0.671 
(0.03) *** 
0.732 
(0.03) 
*** 0.635 
(0.03) *** 
BACHELORS 1.070 
(0.03) 
*** 0.962 
(0.03) *** 
0.991 
(0.03) 
*** 0.872 
(0.03) *** 
MA_MORE 1.371 
(0.03) 
*** 1.255 
(0.04) *** 
1.246 
(0.03) 
*** 1.113 
(0.04) *** 
OCLERICAL -  -0.090 
(0.02) *** 
-  -0.099 
(0.02) *** 
OAGRICRAFT -  -0.042 
(0.03)  
-  -0.050 
(0.02) ** 
OELEMENTARY -  -0.176 
(0.03) *** 
-  -0.186 
(0.02) *** 
OOTHER -  0.054 
(0.03) ** 
-  0.041 
(0.02) * 
IAGRI -  -0.281 
(0.03) *** 
-  -0.283 
(0.02) *** 
ICONSTRUCT -  -0.068 
(0.02) *** 
-  -0.069 
(0.02) *** 
ISOCIAL -  -0.060 
(0.02) *** 
-  -0.061 
(0.01) *** 
LAMBDA -  -  -0.407 
(0.05) 
*** -0.439 
(0.05) *** 
PROVINCIAL/REGIONAL 
FE 
YES YES YES YES 
N 11501 11501 11501 11501 
R2 0.408 0.433 - - 
WALD_CHI2 - - 5144.57 5753.03 
P_VALUE (WALD) - - 0.000 0.000 
Note: Figures in columns (a) and (c) replicated from Tables 4.7 and 4.8. Standard errors in parentheses. All t-values are robust 
and corrected for clustering at the PSU-level. * denotes significance at 10 %, ** at 5 % and *** at 1 % or better.   
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Appendix Table A2: Earnings Functions with Occupation/Industry, Females (15-65)  
OLS W/O 
(a) 
OLS WITH 
(b) 
SSB W/O 
(c) 
SSB WITH 
(d) 
 
VARIABLE 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
CONSTANT 4.307 
(0.13) 
*** 5.224 
(0.19) 
*** 4.310 
(0.46) 
*** 4.861 
(0.45) 
*** 
EXP  0.068 
(0.01) 
*** 0.060 
(0.01) 
*** 0.068 
(0.01) 
*** 0.063 
(0.01) 
*** 
EXP2 -0.001 
(0.00) 
*** -0.001 
(0.00) 
*** -0.001 
(0.00) 
*** -0.001 
(0.00) 
*** 
LESS_PRIMARY 0.334 
(0.14) 
** 0.235 
(0.13) 
* 0.334 
(0.13) 
*** 0.244 
(0.13) 
* 
PRIMARY 0.342 
(0.13) 
** 0.277 
(0.13) 
** 0.343 
(0.12) 
*** 0.252 
(0.11) 
** 
MIDDLE 0.958 
(0.14) 
*** 0.784 
(0.13) 
*** 0.958 
(0.14) 
*** 0.764 
(0.13) 
*** 
MATRIC 1.505 
(0.12) 
*** 0.804 
(0.13) 
*** 1.504 
(0.10) 
*** 0.843 
(0.12) 
*** 
INTER 1.843 
(0.12) 
*** 1.021 
(0.14) 
*** 1.842 
(0.15) 
*** 1.093 
(0.16) 
*** 
BACHELORS 2.294 
(0.11) 
*** 1.384 
(0.13) 
*** 2.293 
(0.18) 
*** 1.502 
(0.19) 
*** 
MA_MORE 2.909 
(0.11) 
*** 1.975 
(0.14) 
*** 2.908 
(0.28) 
*** 2.183 
(0.28) 
*** 
OCLERICAL -  -0.323 
(0.12) *** 
-  -0.316 
(0.11) 
*** 
OAGRICRAFT -  -1.018 
(0.13) *** 
-  -1.015 
(0.11) 
*** 
OELEMENTARY -  -0.498 
(0.16) *** 
-  -0.493 
(0.12) 
*** 
OOTHER -  -0.124 
(0.34)  
-  -0.116 
(0.31)  
IAGRI -  -0.418 
(0.17) ** 
-  -0.421 
(0.09) 
*** 
ICONSTRUCT -  -0.787 
(0.90)  
-  -0.784 
(0.48)  
ISOCIAL -  0.334 
(0.10) *** 
-  0.336 
(0.07) 
*** 
LAMBDA -  -  -0.001 
(0.22) 
 0.176 
(0.21)  
PROVINCIAL/REGIONAL FE YES YES YES YES 
N 2018 2018 2018 2018 
R2 0.478  - - 
WALD_CHI2 - - 1901.26 2318.85 
P_VALUE (WALD) - - 0.000 0.000 
Note: Figures in columns (a) and (c) replicated from Tables 4.7 and 4.8. Standard errors in parentheses. All t-values are robust 
and corrected for clustering at the PSU-level. * denotes significance at 10 %, ** at 5 % and *** at 1 % or better.  
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